Friendships and Favouritism on the Schoolground - A Framed Field Experiment

被引:10
作者
Belot, Michele
van de Ven, Jeroen [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econ, ACLE, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands
关键词
PEER PRESSURE; INCENTIVES; WORKPLACE; ECONOMICS; BEHAVIOR; CHILDREN;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02461.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present experimental evidence on favouritism practices. Children compete in teams in a tournament. After the first round of a real effort task, children indicate which group member they would prefer to do the task in the second round, for the benefit of the team. Friends are much more likely to be chosen than others after controlling for performance. We also find that children who are favoured by their friend subsequently increase performance. Consequently, favouritism does not hurt efficiency. These results show the importance of observing performance ex post in order to properly evaluate the efficiency implications of favouritism.
引用
收藏
页码:1228 / 1251
页数:24
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