Information equilibrium: Punctual structures of information distribution

被引：3

作者：

Novikov, DA ^{[1
]}

Chkhartishvili, AG

机构：

[1] Russian Acad Sci, Trapezniko Inst Control Sci, Moscow, Russia

[2] Moscow MV Lomonosov State Univ, Moscow, Russia

来源：

AUTOMATION AND REMOTE CONTROL | 2003年 / 64卷 / 10期

关键词：

Mechanical Engineer; Nash Equilibrium; System Theory; Nash; Fundamental Parameter;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1026017624308

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

For the reflexive game where the agents make decisions on the basis of a hierarchy of beliefs about the fundamental parameters, beliefs about beliefs, and so on, a concept of information equilibrium was proposed which is a generalization of the Nash equilibrium in the noncooperative games.

引用

页码：1609 / 1619

页数：11

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