The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in the US House of Representatives

被引:88
作者
Andris, Clio [1 ]
Lee, David [2 ,3 ]
Hamilton, Marcus J. [4 ,5 ]
Martino, Mauro [6 ]
Gunning, Christian E. [7 ]
Selden, John Armistead [8 ]
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, Dept Geog, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[2] MIT, Dept Urban Studies & Planning, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[3] MIT, Senseable City Lab, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[4] Santa Fe Inst, Santa Fe, NM 87501 USA
[5] Arizona State Univ, Sch Human Evolut & Social Change, Tempe, AZ USA
[6] IBM Thomas J Watson Res Ctr, Cambridge, MA USA
[7] N Carolina State Univ, Dept Entomol, Raleigh, NC 27695 USA
[8] US Senate, Budget Comm, Washington, DE USA
基金
美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
COMMUNITY STRUCTURE; PARTY POLARIZATION; NETWORK ANALYSIS; DYNAMICS; POLITICS;
D O I
10.1371/journal.pone.0123507
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
It is widely reported that partisanship in the United States Congress is at an historic high. Given that individuals are persuaded to follow party lines while having the opportunity and incentives to collaborate with members of the opposite party, our goal is to measure the extent to which legislators tend to form ideological relationships with members of the opposite party. We quantify the level of cooperation, or lack thereof, between Democrat and Republican Party members in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1949-2012. We define a network of over 5 million pairs of representatives, and compare the mutual agreement rates on legislative decisions between two distinct types of pairs: those from the same party and those formed of members from different parties. We find that despite short-term fluctuations, partisanship or non-cooperation in the U.S. Congress has been increasing exponentially for over 60 years with no sign of abating or reversing. Yet, a group of representatives continue to cooperate across party lines despite growing partisanship.
引用
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页数:14
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