Dynamic common agency

被引：47

作者：

Bergemann, D

Välimäki, J

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] Helsinki Sch Econ, Dept Econ, Helsinki 0100, Finland

[3] Univ Southampton, Southampton, Hants, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2003年 / 111卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

common agency; dynamic bidding; marginal contribution; Markov perfect equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00079-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：23 / 48

页数：26

共 16 条

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