Corporate diversification, refocusing and shareholder voting

被引：5
作者：
Tokbolat, Yerzhan [1 ]
Le, Hang [2 ]
Thompson, Steve [2 ]
机构：
[1] Queens Univ Belfast, Queens Management Sch, Belfast, Antrim, North Ireland
[2] Univ Nottingham, Business Sch, Nottingham, England
来源：
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS | 2021年 / 78卷
关键词：
Shareholder voting; Diversification; Refocusing; Acquisitions; Divestments; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; FIRM PERFORMANCE; ACQUISITIONS; GOVERNANCE; DIRECTORS; PARTICIPATION; DISCOUNT; MERGERS; IMPACT; RISK;
D O I：
10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101924
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We examine if shareholders' attitude towards firm diversification strategy is revealed in their votes on management-initiated acquisition and divestment proposals using data on voting by shareholders of UK public firms between 1997 and 2019. We find that voting dissent is higher for diversifying acquisitions and lower for refocusing divestments, especially when these involve diversified firms. We also find a negative relationship between diversification premium and voting dissent. Our results provide evidence that diversification characteristics of firms and deals have a significant impact on shareholders' dissent in acquisitions and divestments.
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页数：13
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