Managerial Control and Executive Compensation

被引:4
作者
Scherer, F. M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Kennedy Sch Govt, Emeritus, 53 Standish St, Unit 2, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
Corporate governance; Managerial compensation; Principal-agent problem; PAY;
D O I
10.1007/s11151-019-09691-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article analyzes the trajectory and causes of the explosion of American corporate CEOs' compensation relative to that of average workers between 1958 and 2017. The historical data are presented and analyzed in more detail for 2016 and 2017. Important biases in alternative data sets are explored. Alternative hypotheses for the dramatic changes over time are proposed but not resolved. Among other things, the paper investigates the role of tax and other government policy changes and regulation-induced innovations in the organization of executive pay determination.
引用
收藏
页码:315 / 327
页数:13
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