Need or Greed? Conditions for Collective Action against Corruption

被引:79
作者
Bauhr, Monika [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
来源
GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS | 2017年 / 30卷 / 04期
关键词
TRANSPARENCY; PERCEPTIONS; POLITICIANS; INFORMATION; DEMOCRACY; QUALITY; VOTERS;
D O I
10.1111/gove.12232
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
This article calls into question one of the implicit assumptions linking democratic accountability to reduced corruption, namely, that citizens will expose institutions rife with venality and mobilize for better government. Instead, mobilization may be contingent on the type of corruption. The study develops a distinction between need and greed corruption and suggest that citizens are more likely to engage in the fight against corruption when corruption is needed to gain access to fair treatment (need corruption) as opposed to special illicit advantages (greed corruption). Using data from the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the study suggest that need corruption mobilizes citizens, in particular if they perceive that fellow citizens will also engage, while greed corruption leads to secrecy, demobilization, and a propensity to free ride on other citizens' anticorruption efforts. The study thereby contributes to a better understanding of fundamental conditions for collective action against corruption and explaining why greed corruption persists in societies with well-established institutions for accountability.
引用
收藏
页码:561 / 581
页数:21
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