Does monetary punishment crowd out pro-social motivation? A natural experiment on hospital length of stay

被引：51

作者：

Holmas, Tor Helge ^{[6
]}

Kjerstad, Egil ^{[5
]}

Luras, Hilde ^{[4
]}

Straume, Odd Rune ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Minho, Dept Econ, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal

[2] Univ Minho, NIPE, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal

[3] Univ Bergen, Dept Econ, N-5020 Bergen, Norway

[4] Akershus Univ Hosp, Helse Sor Ost Hlth Serv Res Ctr, Oslo, Norway

[5] Inst Res Econ & Business Adm SNF, N-5045 Bergen, Norway

[6] Uni Rokkan Ctr, N-5015 Bergen, Norway

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION | 2010年 / 75卷 / 02期

关键词：

Motivation crowding; Intrinsic motivation; Monetary punishment; Hospital length of stay; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; INCENTIVES; REINFORCEMENT; REWARDS; ENOUGH; PRICE; FINE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jebo.2010.03.024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study whether the use of monetary incentives might be counter-productive. In particular, we analyse the effect of fining owners of long-term care institutions who prolong length of stay at hospitals. Exploiting a unique natural experiment involving changes in the catchment areas of two large Norwegian hospitals, we find that hospital length of stay are longer in the hospital using fines to reduce length of stay compared with the hospital not using monetary punishment. We interpret these results as examples of monetary incentives crowding-out agents' intrinsic motivation, leading to a reduction in effort. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：261 / 267

页数：7