What Kind of Is-Ought Gap is There and What Kind Ought There Be?

被引:0
作者
Magnus, P. D. [1 ]
Mandle, Jon [1 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Albany, Albany, NY 12222 USA
关键词
is-ought gap; Hume's law; inference barrier; metaethics; normativity;
D O I
10.1163/17455243-46810072
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a gap. The question of an is-ought gap is a practical and strategic matter rather than a logical one, and it may properly be answered in different ways for different questions or at different times.
引用
收藏
页码:373 / 393
页数:21
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