Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market

被引：97

作者：

Bower, J ^{[1
]}

Bunn, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] London Business Sch, London NW1 4SA, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2001年 / 25卷 / 3-4期

基金：

英国经济与社会研究理事会;

关键词：

agent-based computational economics; auction design; electricity markets; market power;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00036-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The question of whether the uniform price or discriminatory auction format is the better multi-unit auction mechanism is addressed in the context of the 1999 debate on reforming the England & Wales electricity market. Each generator is modelled as an autonomous adaptive agent capable of endogenously developing its own bidding strategies using a naive reinforcement learning algorithm. The discriminatory auction results in higher market prices than the uniform-price auction. This is because market prices are not publicly available and agents with a large market share gain a significant informational advantage in a discriminatory auction, thereby facing less competitive pressure. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C63; C7; D43; D44; L94.

引用

页码：561 / 592

页数：32

共 45 条

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[Anonymous], NEW PALGRAVE DICT EC

[2] AUCTIONS OF DIVISIBLE GOODS - ON THE RATIONALE FOR THE TREASURY EXPERIMENT [J].