Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions

被引:67
作者
Su, Qi [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Allen, Benjamin [4 ]
Plotkin, Joshua B. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Dept Biol, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Univ Penn, Ctr Math Biol, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[3] Univ Penn, Dept Math, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[4] Emmanuel Coll, Dept Math, Boston, MA 02115 USA
关键词
cooperation; evolutionary game theory; asymmetric relationships; directed graphs; HIERARCHY FORMATION; NETWORK STRUCTURE; DYNAMICS; SELECTION; MODELS; RULES;
D O I
10.1073/pnas.2113468118
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
How cooperation emerges in human societies is both an evolutionary enigma and a practical problem with tangible implications for societal health. Population structure has long been recognized as a catalyst for cooperation because local interactions facilitate reciprocity. Analysis of population structure typically assumes bidirectional social interactions. But human social interactions are often unidirectional-where one individual has the opportunity to contribute altruistically to another, but not conversely-as the result of organizational hierarchies, social stratification, popularity effects, and endogenous mechanisms of network growth. Here we expand the theory of cooperation in structured populations to account for both uni- and bidirectional social interactions. Even though unidirectional interactions remove the opportunity for reciprocity, we find that cooperation can nonetheless be favored in directed social networks and that cooperation is provably maximized for networks with an intermediate proportion of unidirectional interactions, as observed in many empirical settings. We also identify two simple structural motifs that allow efficient modification of interaction directions to promote cooperation by orders of magnitude. We discuss how our results relate to the concepts of generalized and indirect reciprocity.
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页数:11
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