Cartel stability under quality differentiation

被引：13

作者：

Bos, Iwan ^{[1
]}

Marini, Marco A. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Maastricht Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Dept Org & Strategy, Maastricht, Netherlands

[2] Univ Roma La Sapienza, Dept Social & Econ Sci, Rome, Italy

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2019年 / 174卷

关键词：

Cartel stability; Collusion; Vertical differentiation; PRICE-COMPETITION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the firm with the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. The lowest-quality supplier has the tightest incentive constraint when the difference in unit production costs is sufficiently small. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：70 / 73

页数：4

共 11 条

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