Information aggregation and strategic abstention in large laboratory elections

被引：36

作者：

Battaglini, Marco ^{[1
]}

Morton, Rebecca B. ^{[2
]}

Palfrey, Thomas R. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Econ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

[2] NYU, Dept Polit, New York, NY 10012 USA

[3] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2008年 / 98卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.98.2.194

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：194 / 200

页数：7

相关论文

共 18 条

[1] Information aggregation, rationality, and the condorcet jury theorem
AustenSmith, D
Banks, JS
[J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1996, 90 (01) : 34 - 45
[2] BATTAGLINI M, 2007, 1263 CAL I TECHN SOC
[3] Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms
Battaglini, Marco
Morton, Rebecca
Palfrey, Thomas
[J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 2007, 101 (03) : 409 - 424
[4] Choosing not to choose:: on the link between information and abstention
Coupé, T
Noury, AG
[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2004, 84 (02) : 261 - 265
[5] Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information
Feddersen, T
Pesendorfer, W
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1997, 65 (05) : 1029 - 1058
[6] Rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting
Feddersen, TJ
[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 2004, 18 (01) : 99 - 112
[7] Feddersen TJ, 1996, AM ECON REV, V86, P408
[8] Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences
Feddersen, TJ
Pesendorfer, W
[J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1999, 93 (02) : 381 - 398
[9] Friedman J., 1996, The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered
[10] Television and voter turnout
Gentzkow, Matthew
[J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2006, 121 (03) : 931 - 972