The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players

被引:23
作者
Askoura, Y. [1 ]
机构
[1] GRETIA, INRETS, F-93166 Noisy Le Grand, France
关键词
Weak-core; alpha-core; Game with a continuum of players; Large anonymous games; Normal form games; NONCONVEX PREFERENCES; APPROXIMATE CORES; EXISTENCE; EQUILIBRIA; MARKETS; TRADERS; THEOREM; NONEMPTINESS; ECONOMY; SPACE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.11.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper deals with the weak-core of normal form games with a continuum set of players and without side payments. This concept is an approximation of the core introduced by Weber, Shapley and Shubik. The weak-core is slightly larger than Aumann's alpha-core when adapted to large anonymous games. A non-emptiness result is obtained based on the well known Scarfs non-vacuity theorem for finite games. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:43 / 47
页数:5
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