Induction, Rationality, and the Realism/Anti-realism Debate: A Reply to Shech

被引:1
作者
Wray, K. Brad [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Aarhus Univ, Ctr Sci Studies, Ny Munkegade 118, Aarhus, Denmark
[2] Aarhus Univ, Aarhus Inst Adv Studies, Aarhus, Denmark
关键词
Anti-realism; inductive inferences; scientific rationality; Darwinian/selectionist explanation; the success of science;
D O I
10.1080/02698595.2022.2113627
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
Shech (2022) offers a critical assessment of my defense of anti-realism, developed in Resisting Scientific Realism. Induction and inductive inferences play a central role in Shech's critical analysis of my defense of realism. I argue that Shech's criticisms that relate to induction and inductive inference are problematic, and do not constitute a threat to my defense of anti-realism. Contrary to what Shech claims, the anti-realist does not need to explain why inductive inferences are successful. That is not part of contemporary realism/anti-realism debate. Further, such a demand fails to recognise that some anti-realists do not put much stock in induction.
引用
收藏
页码:243 / 247
页数:5
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