Selecting cheap-talk equilibria

被引：109

作者：

Chen, Ying ^{[1
]}

Kartik, Navin ^{[2
]}

Sobel, Joel ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Arizona State Univ, Dept Econ, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA

[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Econ, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2008年 / 76卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

cheap talk; babbling; equilibrium selection; almost-cheap talk;

D O I：

10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS (no incentive to separate), that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NITS, including perturbed cheap-talk games with nonstrategic players or costly lying. We also apply NITS to other models of cheap talk, illustrating its potential beyond the CS framework.

引用

页码：117 / 136

页数：20

共 20 条

[1] EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J].