Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case

被引:59
作者
Kaplan, Todd R. [1 ,2 ]
Zamir, Shmuel [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Exeter, Sch Business, Dept Econ, Exeter EX4 4PU, Devon, England
[2] Univ Haifa, Dept Econ, IL-31905 Haifa, Israel
[3] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Study Rat, Jerusalem, Israel
关键词
Asymmetric auctions; First-price auctions; Incomplete information; PRICE AUCTIONS; EQUILIBRIUM; INFORMATION; UNIQUENESS; EXISTENCE; REVENUE; RESALE;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-010-0563-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on and . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear.
引用
收藏
页码:269 / 302
页数:34
相关论文
共 27 条
[1]   Log-concave probability and its applications [J].
Bagnoli, M ;
Bergstrom, T .
ECONOMIC THEORY, 2005, 26 (02) :445-469
[2]  
Baye M., 2010, EC THEORY IN PRESS
[3]   Winner-take-all price competition [J].
Baye, MR ;
Morgan, J .
ECONOMIC THEORY, 2002, 19 (02) :271-282
[4]  
Baye MR, 1996, ECON THEORY, V8, P291, DOI 10.1007/s001990050092
[5]   The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions [J].
Cantillon, Estelle .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2008, 62 (01) :1-25
[6]  
Cheng H, 2010, ASYMMETRIC 1 PRICE A
[7]   Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions [J].
Cheng, Harrison .
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 42 (4-5) :471-498
[8]  
GRIESMER JH, 1967, NAV RES LOGIST Q, V14, P415
[9]   Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions:: An experimental study [J].
Güth, W ;
Ivanova-Stenzel, R ;
Wolfstetter, E .
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2005, 49 (07) :1891-1913
[10]   Asymmetric auctions with resale [J].
Hafalir, Isa ;
Krishna, Vijay .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2008, 98 (01) :87-112