The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively

被引：48

作者：

Dietrich, Simone ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2011年 / 39卷 / 01期

关键词：

foreign aid effectiveness; health aid; corruption; immunization; DTP3; FOREIGN; ALLOCATION; COUNTRIES; POLICIES; GROWTH;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.06.011

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Conventional wisdom suggests that foreign aid is more effective in less corrupt states. Recently, however, research is emerging that suggests that this argument may be too broad and that the effect of governance on aid effectiveness is masked by the study of aggregate aid flows. I focus on the public health sector and develop an argument of strategic compliance: corrupt recipient governments have incentives to comply with donor objectives but they will do so in aid sectors, in which compliance is cheap. I use two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) as my primary estimation technique. I find strong and robust evidence for my argument. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：55 / 63

页数：9

共 48 条

[11] Evidence on Changes in Aid Allocation Criteria [J].