Rationality, Imitation, and Rational Imitation in Spatial Public Goods Games

被引:11
作者
Govaert, Alain [1 ]
Ramazi, Pouria [2 ,3 ]
Cao, Ming [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Groningen, Fac Sci & Engn, Engn & Technol Inst Groningen ENTEG, NL-9747 AG Groningen, Netherlands
[2] Univ Alberta, Dept Math & Stat Sci, Edmonton, AB T6G 2R3, Canada
[3] Univ Alberta, Dept Comp Sci, Edmonton, AB T6G 2R3, Canada
来源
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS | 2021年 / 8卷 / 03期
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Convergence; cooperation; generalized Nash equilibrium; imitation; n-player games; public goods game; rationality; spatial games; EVOLUTION; DYNAMICS; COOPERATION; RULE;
D O I
10.1109/TCNS.2021.3065655
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
In both economic and evolutionary theories of games, two general classes of evolution can be identified: 1) dynamics based on myopic optimization and 2) dynamics based on imitations or replications. The collective behavior of structured populations governed by these dynamics can vary significantly. Particularly in social dilemmas, myopic optimizations typically lead to Nash equilibrium payoffs that are well below the optimum, e.g., the tragedy of the commons, whereas imitations can hinder equilibration while allowing higher cooperation levels and payoffs. Motivated by economic and behavioral studies, in this article, we investigate how the benefits of the two dynamics can be combined in an intuitive decision rule, rational imitation, that is to mimic successful others only if it earns you a higher payoff. In contrast to purely rational (best-response) or purely imitative decision rules, the combination in rational imitation dynamics both guarantees finite time convergence to an imitation equilibrium profile on arbitrary networks and can facilitate high levels of cooperation for small public goods multipliers.
引用
收藏
页码:1324 / 1335
页数:12
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