Transactional-institutional fit: Corporate governance of R&D investment in different institutional contexts

被引：24

作者：

James, Barclay E. ^{[1
]}

McGuire, Jean B. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ San Francisco Quito, USFQ Business Sch, Campus Cumbaya, Quito 170901, Ecuador

[2] Louisiana State Univ, Rucks Dept Management, 2709 Business Educ Complex, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH | 2016年 / 69卷 / 09期

关键词：

Corporate governance; Institutional context; R&D investment; Transaction cost economics; Bank-based system; Market-based system; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; RELATIONSHIP BANKING; FINANCIAL-SYSTEM; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; FIRM INNOVATION; PUBLIC DEBT; CHOICE; DETERMINANTS; PERFORMANCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.01.038

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Management research has a rich historydevoted to understanding how different types of equity holders facilitate effective governance of investment in research and development (R&D). But scant research exists on understanding how different types of debt effectively govern R&D investment and virtually no research exists on this topic across institutional contexts. Yet, similar types of transactions differ across institutional contexts. This study develops and tests a transactional-institutional fit view of debt governance of R&D investment, grounded in transaction cost economics, which examines the alignment or fit between bank loan debt, bond debt, and R&D investment in bank-based and market-based countries. Analyses of 7943 firms across 12 countries from 19972010 support the key proposition: in bank-based (market-based) countries, higher levels of bank loan debt coupled with higher levels of R&D investment increase (decrease) firm performance. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：3478 / 3486

页数：9

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