Rationality, Capacity and Inference

被引：0

作者：

Gjelsvik, Olav ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oslo, Dept Philosophy Class Hist Art & Ideas, CSMN, N-0317 Oslo, Norway

来源：

TEOREMA | 2015年 / 34卷 / 02期

关键词：

Reasoning; Rationality; Mind; Rational Capacity; Practical Inference; Enkratic Inference;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

This paper is in broad agreement with Broome in that we ought to dispose of Humeanism about practical reason. Still, there remains some disagreement with Broome about the big picture. The aim of this short paper is to try and locate the most important sources of this disagreement, namely differences in how we conceive of the mind, reason and rationality and the relations between these. It also presents some the consequences of the big picture disagreement, in particular about how to conceive of the correctness of enkratic reasoning.

引用

页码：105 / 116

页数：12