Buy prices in online auctions: irrationality on the internet?

被引：118

作者：

Budish, EB ^{[1
]}

Takeyama, LN ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Amherst Coll, Dept Econ, Amherst, MA 01002 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 72卷 / 03期

关键词：

buy price; auctions;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00438-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Buy prices are puzzling: it makes sense for a seller at auction to set a minimum bidding level (i.e., a reserve price), surely, but a maximum? We explore the use of maximum bidding levels (buy prices) in online auctions and provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational auction mechanism. We show that augmenting an English auction with a buy price can improve the seller's profits by partially insuring (and therefore increasing the expected payment from) some risk-averse bidders. Perhaps more surprising is that the English auction augmented with a buy price can also be superior even to the first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions when bidders are risk averse. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：325 / 333

页数：9