A general framework for wireless spectrum auctions

被引:119
作者
Gandhi, Sorabh [1 ]
Buragohain, Chiranjeeb [2 ]
Cao, Lili [1 ]
Zheng, Haitao [1 ]
Suri, Subhash [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Comp Sci, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA
[2] Amazon com, Seattle, WA 98106 USA
来源
2007 2ND IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON NEW FRONTIERS IN DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS NETWORKS, VOLS 1 AND 2 | 2007年
关键词
D O I
10.1109/DYSPAN.2007.12
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
We propose a real-time spectrum auction framework to distribute spectrum among a large number wireless users under interference constraints. Our approach achieves conict-fr ee spectrum allocations that maximize auction revenue and spectrum utilization. Our design includes a compact and yet highly expressive bidding language, various pricing models to control tradeoffs between revenue and fairness, and fast auction clearing algorithms to compute revenue-maximizing prices and allocations. Both analytical and experimental results verify the ef ciency of the proposed approach. We conclude that bidding behaviors and pricing models have signi cant impact on auction outcomes. A spectrum auction system must consider local demand and spectrum availability in order to maximize revenue and utilization.
引用
收藏
页码:22 / +
页数:2
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