Market structure and welfare under monopolistic competition

被引:1
作者
Sa, Nelson [1 ]
机构
[1] Vassar Coll, Dept Econ, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604 USA
关键词
Sunk costs; Monopolistic competition; Welfare; DIFFERENTIATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.018
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes the relationship between market structure and welfare by developing a model of monopolistic competition in which exogenous entry costs and endogenous differentiation costs determine market concentration and market power. A non-monotonic link is identified between these costs and welfare under a decentralized equilibrium. These results detail new reasons why simple market concentration indicators are a misleading statistic for welfare evaluations. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:69 / 72
页数:4
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