Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks

被引:11
作者
Musunuri, Sriharshita [1 ]
Sandbrink, Jonas B. [2 ,3 ]
Monrad, Joshua Teperowski [2 ,4 ,5 ]
Palmer, Megan J. [6 ,7 ]
Koblentz, Gregory D. [8 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Dept Chem, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] Univ Oxford, Future Humanity Inst, Oxford, England
[3] Univ Oxford, Med Sci Div, Oxford, England
[4] London Sch Hyg & Trop Med, Fac Publ Hlth & Policy, London, England
[5] London Sch Econ, Dept Hlth Policy, London, England
[6] Stanford Univ, Dept Bioengn, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[7] Stanford Univ, Ctr Int Secur & Cooperat CISAC, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[8] George Mason Univ, Schar Sch Policy & Govt, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA
关键词
COVID-19; dual-use research; biosecurity; biosafety; pandemic preparedness; preprints; zoonotic risk; BIOSECURITY; VECTORS; VIRUS; TRANSMISSION; PREPRINTS; BIOSAFETY;
D O I
10.1128/mBio.01864-21
中图分类号
Q93 [微生物学];
学科分类号
071005 ; 100705 ;
摘要
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world's vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.
引用
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页数:10
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