Stability of International Environmental Agreements in leadership model

被引：1

作者：

Zhang, Jin ^{[1
]}

Wang, Shouyang ^{[2
]}

Zu, Lei ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] McGill Univ, Dept Econ, Montreal, PQ H3A 2T7, Canada

[2] Chinese Acad Sci, Grad Univ, Sch Management, Beijing 100080, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE & COMPLEXITY | 2008年 / 21卷 / 02期

关键词：

coalition; International Environmental Agreements; leadership model; sequential game; stable size;

D O I：

10.1007/s11424-008-9102-1

中图分类号：

O1 [数学];

学科分类号：

0701 ; 070101 ;

摘要：

International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) are a form of cooperation ratified by countries which can improve the management of shared environmental resources. The authors analyze the stability of International Environmental Agreements in leadership model. In 2006, Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis found that a stable coalition consists of either 2, 3, or 4 members if the number of countries is greater than 4. Their model is reconsidered. It is shown that the size of stable IEAs decreases from 3 to 2 when the total number of countries involved increases. However, a situation that can guarantee 4 to be the size of stable IEAs could not be found.

引用

页码：184 / 190

页数：7

共 12 条

[1] SELF-ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS [J].