Do firms manage earnings to meet dividend thresholds?

被引:103
作者
Daniel, Naveen D. [3 ]
Denis, David J. [1 ]
Naveen, Lalitha [2 ]
机构
[1] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
[2] Temple Univ, Fox Sch Business, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA
[3] Drexel Univ, LeBow Coll Business, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
dividend policy; dividend smoothing; earnings management; accruals;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.11.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Dividend-paying firms tend to manage earnings upward when their earnings would otherwise fall short of expected dividend levels. This behavior is evident only in firms with positive debt and is more aggressive prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, subsequent to the 2003 dividend tax cut, in high-payout firms, in firms whose CEOs receive higher dollar dividends and have higher pay-performance sensitivities, and in firms that raise less outside equity. Moreover, this earnings management behavior appears to significantly impact the likelihood of a dividend cut. Our findings imply that managers treat expected dividend levels as an important earnings threshold. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2 / 26
页数:25
相关论文
共 80 条
[1]   QUARTERLY DIVIDEND AND EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS AND STOCKHOLDERS RETURNS - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS [J].
AHARONY, J ;
SWARY, I .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1980, 35 (01) :1-12
[2]   FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY [J].
ALTMAN, EI .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 1968, 23 (04) :589-609
[3]  
[Anonymous], ESTIMATING STANDARD
[4]   The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition [J].
Ball, R ;
Shivakumar, L .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2006, 44 (02) :207-242
[5]   Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications [J].
Bartov, E ;
Gul, FA ;
Tsui, JSL .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2000, 30 (03) :421-452
[6]  
Becker C., 1998, Contemporary Accounting Research, V15, P1, DOI 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1998.tb00547.x
[7]  
Benartzi S, 1997, J FINANC, V52, P1007, DOI 10.2307/2329514
[8]  
Bergstresser D, 2006, Q J ECON, V121, P157
[9]   CEO incentives and earnings management [J].
Bergstresser, Daniel ;
Philippon, Thomas .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 80 (03) :511-529
[10]  
BRADLEY M, 2004, STRUCTURE PRICING BO