ON THE PERFORMANCE OF LINEAR CONTRACTS

被引：29

作者：

Bose, Arup ^{[1
]}

Pal, Debashis ^{[2
]}

Sappington, David E. M. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Indian Stat Inst, Kolkata 700108, India

[2] Univ Cincinnati, Dept Econ, Cincinnati, OH 45221 USA

[3] Univ Florida, Dept Econ, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2011年 / 20卷 / 01期

关键词：

PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS; DOUBLE MORAL-HAZARD; INCENTIVE SCHEMES; RISK; PROCUREMENT; SELECTION; BEHAVIOR; REGIMES; FIRMS; PAY;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1530-9134.2010.00286.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the ability of linear contracts to replicate the performance of optimal unrestricted contracts in the canonical moral hazard setting with a wealth constrained, risk averse agent. We find that in a broad class of environments, the principal can always secure with a linear contract at least 95% of the profit that she secures with an optimal unrestricted contract, provided the productivity of the agent's effort is not too meager.

引用

页码：159 / 193

页数：35

共 32 条

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