Household Search and the Marital Wage Premium

被引：11
作者：
Pilossoph, Laura [1 ]
Wee, Shu Lin [2 ]
机构：
[1] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY 10045 USA
[2] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS | 2021年 / 13卷 / 04期
基金：
美国国家卫生研究院; 美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
JOB SEARCH; MARRIAGE; MEN; EARNINGS;
D O I：
10.1257/mac.20180092
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We develop a model where selection into marriage and household search generate a marital wage premium. Beyond selection, married individuals earn higher wages for two reasons. First, income pooling within a joint household raises risk-averse individuals' reservation wages. Second, married individuals climb the job ladder faster, as they internalize that higher wages increase their partner's selectivity over offers. Specialization according to comparative advantage in search generates a premium that increases in spousal education, as in the data. Quantitatively, household search explains 10-33 -percent and 20-58 percent of the premium for males and females, respectively, and accounts for its increase with spousal education.
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页码：55 / 109
页数：55
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