Early Admissions at Selective Colleges

被引:56
作者
Avery, Christopher [1 ]
Levin, Jonathan [2 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.100.5.2125
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Early admissions are widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm. (JEL C78, I23)
引用
收藏
页码:2125 / 2156
页数:32
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