How do independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs? Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock

被引：6

作者：

Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn ^{[1
,2
]}

Jiraporn, Pornsit ^{[3
]}

Treepongkaruna, Sirimon ^{[4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Chulalongkorn Univ, Sasin Sch Management, Bangkok, Thailand

[2] Chulalongkorn Univ, Sasin Sch Management, Ctr Excellence Management Res Corp Governance & B, 254 Phayathai Rd, Bangkok 10330, Thailand

[3] Penn State Univ, Sch Grad Profess Studies, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

[4] Univ Western Australia, UWA Business Sch, 35 Stirling Hwy, Perth, WA 6009, Australia

[5] Chulalongkorn Univ, Sasin Sch Management, Res Unit Sustainabil Finance & Capital Market Dev, 254 Phayathai Rd, Bangkok 10330, Thailand

来源：

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS | 2021年 / 78卷

关键词：

Generalist CEOs; Specialist CEOs; Independent directors; Board independence; Corporate governance; Sarbanes-Oxley; SARBANES-OXLEY-ACT; GOVERNANCE EVIDENCE; COMPENSATION; EXPERIENCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101957

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a quasi-natural experiment, we explore how independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs. Generalist CEOs possess the general managerial skills that can be applied across firms and industries. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that independent directors view generalist CEOs unfavorably. Firms forced to raise board independence experience a lower increase in CEO general ability than those not required to change board composition. Additional analysis confirms the results, including fixed- and random-effects regressions, propensity score matching, instrumental-variable analysis, and Oster's (2019) technique for testing coefficient stability.

引用

页数：10

共 8 条

[1] How do independent directors view powerful CEOs? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
Jiraporn, Pornsit
Jumreornvong, Seksak
Jiraporn, Napatsorn
Singh, Simran
FINANCE RESEARCH LETTERS, 2016, 16 : 268 - 274
[2] How do independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
Chintrakarn, Pandej
Jiraporn, Pornsit
Tong, Shenghui
Jiraporn, Napatsorn
Proctor, Richard
FINANCIAL REVIEW, 2020, 55 (04) : 697 - 716
[3] How do Independent Directors View Carbon Information Disclosure? Evidence From China
Khan, Haroon Ur Rashid
Bin Khidmat, Waqas
Awan, Sadia
Al Hares, Osama
Saleem, Kashif
FRONTIERS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, 2022, 10
[4] How do independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR) during a stressful time? Evidence from the financial crisis
Chintrakarn, Pandej
Jiraporn, Pornsit
Treepongkaruna, Sirimon
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2021, 71 : 143 - 160
[5] Do Independent Directors Matter? Evidence from Regulatory Change in an Emerging Market
Huang, Hsu-Huei
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE, 2022, 58 (04) : 1137 - 1146
[6] How do independent directors view carbon information disclosure? Evidence from China (vol 10, 853590, 2022)
Khan, Haroon Ur Rashid
Bin Khidmat, Waqas
Al Hares, Osama
Awan, Sadia
Saleem, Kashif
FRONTIERS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, 2022, 10
[7] How do powerful CEOs view dividends and stock repurchases? Evidence from the CEO pay slice (CPS)
Chintrakarn, Pandej
Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn
Tong, Shenghui
Jiraporn, Pornsit
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, 2018, 58 : 49 - 64
[8] How do Independent Directors Influence Corporate Risk-Taking. Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment
Jiraporn, Pornsit
Lee, Sang Mook
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, 2018, 18 (03) : 507 - 519

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