Career concerns and the busy life of the young CEO

被引：113

作者：

Li, Xiaoyang ^{[1
]}

Low, Angie ^{[2
]}

Makhija, Anil K. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Shanghai Adv Inst Finance, Shanghai, Peoples R China

[2] Nanyang Technol Univ, Nanyang Business Sch, Singapore, Singapore

[3] Ohio State Univ, Fisher Coll Business, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2017年 / 47卷

关键词：

Career concerns; CEO age; Real investments; Restructuring; Census data; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; INVESTMENT; TURNOVER; ACQUISITIONS; POLICIES; FIRM; AGE; OVERCONFIDENCE; PREFERENCES; PERSPECTIVE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine how real investment decisions of firms are affected by their CEOs' career concerns. Relative to their older counterparts, younger CEOs are more likely to enter new lines of businesses and exit from existing ones. Younger CEOs undertake bolder expansions and divestments, which lead to significant increases and decreases in firm size, respectively. Younger CEOs also prefer to grow through acquisitions than de novo investments. However, such busier investment style of the younger CEOs appears not to hurt firm efficiency. Additional results also shed light on how CEO favoritism distorts capital allocation within firms. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：88 / 109

页数：22

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