Does market size matter for charities?

被引:4
作者
Lapointe, Simon [1 ]
Perroni, Carlo [2 ,3 ]
Scharf, Kimberley [3 ,4 ,5 ]
Tukiainen, Janne [1 ,6 ]
机构
[1] VATT Inst Econ Res, Arkadiankatu 7, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
[2] Univ Warwick, Dept Econ, Gibbet Hill Rd, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[3] CESIfo, Munich, Germany
[4] Univ Birmingham, Dept Econ, Birmingham B15 2TT, W Midlands, England
[5] CEPR, London, England
[6] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Govt, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, England
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
Competition in charity sectors; Market structure; FREE ENTRY; COMPETITION; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We analyze implications of market size for market structure in the charity sector. While a standard model of oligopolistic for-profit competition predicts a positive relationship between market size and firm size, our analogous model of competition between prosocially motivated charities predicts no such correlation. If charities are biased towards their own provision, a positive association between market size and provider size can arise. We examine these predictions empirically for six different local charity markets. Our empirical findings suggest that charities do not solely pursue prosocial objectives, and that increased competition in the charity sector can lead to rationalization in provision. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:127 / 145
页数:19
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