Bayesian Versus Orthodox Statistics: Which Side Are You On?

被引:700
作者
Dienes, Zoltan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sussex, Sch Psychol, Brighton BN1 9QH, E Sussex, England
关键词
statistical inference; Bayes; significance testing; evidence; likelihood principle; STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION; CONFIDENCE-INTERVALS; PSYCHOLOGY; TESTS;
D O I
10.1177/1745691611406920
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Researchers are often confused about what can be inferred from significance tests. One problem occurs when people apply Bayesian intuitions to significance testing-two approaches that must be firmly separated. This article presents some common situations in which the approaches come to different conclusions; you can see where your intuitions initially lie. The situations include multiple testing, deciding when to stop running participants, and when a theory was thought of relative to finding out results. The interpretation of nonsignificant results has also been persistently problematic in a way that Bayesian inference can clarify. The Bayesian and orthodox approaches are placed in the context of different notions of rationality, and I accuse myself and others as having been irrational in the way we have been using statistics on a key notion of rationality. The reader is shown how to apply Bayesian inference in practice, using free online software, to allow more coherent inferences from data.
引用
收藏
页码:274 / 290
页数:17
相关论文
共 49 条