Economic consequences of SEC disclosure regulation: evidence from the OTC bulletin board

被引:225
作者
Bushee, BJ [1 ]
Leuz, C [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
mandatory disclosure; enforcement; externalities; over-the-counter market; liquidity; listing choices; eligibility rule;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.04.002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the economic consequences of a regulatory change mandating OTCBB firms to comply with reporting requirements tinder the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. This change substantially increases mandated disclosures for firms previously not filing with the SEC. We document that the imposition of disclosure requirements results in significant costs for smaller firms, forcing them off the OTCBB. SEC regulation also has significant benefits. Firms previously filing with the SEC experience positive stock returns and permanent increases in liquidity, suggesting positive externalities from disclosure regulation. Newly Compliant firms exhibit significant increases in liquidity consistent with improved disclosure reducing information asymmetry. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:233 / 264
页数:32
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