The auditor reputation cycle: A synthesis of the literature

被引:11
作者
Bergner, Jason [1 ]
Marquardt, Blair B. [2 ]
Mohapatra, Partha [3 ]
机构
[1] Western Kentucky Univ, Gordon Ford Coll Business, Accounting, Bowling Green, KY 42101 USA
[2] Univ North Texas, G Brint Ryan Coll Business, Accounting, Denton, TX 76203 USA
[3] Calif State Univ Sacramento, Coll Business Adm, Accounting, Sacramento, CA 95819 USA
关键词
Audit Quality; Auditor Reputation; Reputation Cycle; Reputation Hypothesis; Reputation Loss; STOCK-MARKET REACTION; BIG; 4; INDUSTRY EXPERTISE; OFFICE-LEVEL; BRAND-NAME; QUALITY; EARNINGS; IMPACT; FIRM; CONSEQUENCES;
D O I
10.1111/ijau.12193
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The auditor reputation hypothesis states that auditors conduct high-quality audits to build a positive reputation in the marketplace so that they can retain clients and earn fee premiums. We consolidate the dispersed literature on this hypothesis and introduce a framework that presents auditor reputation as a cycle. The overall conclusions support the predictions of our framework regarding reputation as an incentive for audit quality. However, challenges remain in isolating and quantifying the impact. We observe moderating factors on both the supply and demand sides. We also find that existing research has emphasized certain aspects of our framework while addressing others more sparsely. Relatively little is known about how audit firms earn their reputation or how they rebuild it after an audit failure. Mixed evidence in some areas, along with research gaps in the framework, provides opportunities for future research on auditor reputation. Our framework can guide these endeavors.
引用
收藏
页码:292 / 319
页数:28
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