Optimal Taxation: Merging Micro and Macro Approaches

被引:10
作者
Golosov, Mikhail [1 ]
Troshkin, Maxim [2 ]
Tsyvinski, Aleh [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Econ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] Univ Minnesota, Dept Econ, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
关键词
optimal taxation; efficiency; asymmetric and private information; redistributive effects; optimal social insurance; INCOME; INSURANCE; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00413.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper argues that the large body of research that follows Mirrlees approach to optimal taxation has been developing in two directions, referred to as the micro and macro literatures. We review the two literatures and argue that both deliver important insights that are often complementary to each other. We argue that merging the micro and macro approaches can prove beneficial to our understanding of the nature of efficient redistribution and social insurance and can deliver implementable policy recommendations.
引用
收藏
页码:147 / 174
页数:28
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