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Learning in games with risky payoffs
被引:6
|作者:
Shafran, Aric P.
[1
]
机构:
[1] Calif Polytech State Univ San Luis Obispo, Orfalea Coll Business, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407 USA
关键词:
Learning in games;
Reinforcement learning;
Fictitious play;
Experiments;
Stochastic payoffs;
NORMAL-FORM GAMES;
REINFORCEMENT;
INFORMATION;
MODELS;
COORDINATION;
EQUILIBRIA;
SELECTION;
CHOICE;
D O I:
10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.001
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
This paper analyzes learning in multi-player noncooperative games with risky payoffs. The goal of the paper is to assess the relative importance of stochastic payoffs and expected payoffs in the learning process. A general learning model which nests several variations of reinforcement learning, belief-based learning, and experience-weighted attraction learning is used to analyze behavior in coordination game and prisoner's dilemma experiments with probabilistic payoffs. In all experiments, some subjects learn from past lottery outcomes, though the importance of these stochastic payoffs relative to expected payoffs depends on the game. Stochastic payoffs are less important when posted probabilities are equal to expected payoffs and more important when subjects are informed how much they would have earned from foregone strategies. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码:354 / 371
页数:18
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