Organizational Control and Work Effort - Another Look at the Interplay of Rewards and Motivation

被引:21
作者
Kunz, Jennifer [1 ]
Linder, Stefan [2 ]
机构
[1] Goethe Univ Frankfurt, Dept Accounting, D-60323 Frankfurt, Germany
[2] ESSEC Business Sch, Dept Accounting & Management Control, F-95021 Paris, France
关键词
SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; PERFORMANCE-MEASUREMENT; RESEARCH DIRECTIONS; KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER; EXTRINSIC REWARDS; RISK; INCENTIVES; DECREMENTS; CONTRACTS;
D O I
10.1080/09638180.2012.684498
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Providing rewards is a central element of organizational control systems. However, the literature is hardly helpful from a practitioner's perspective: it typically focuses on monetary rewards at the expense of non-monetary, affiliative rewards, and yet researchers disagree over the usefulness of the prior ones. Some scholars claim that monetary rewards merely replace task-related ('intrinsic') motivation by reward-induced external pressure ('extrinsic' motivation). Empirical findings are mixed, partially given the different conceptualizations of intrinsic motivation. We shed more light on the impact of both monetary and non-monetary, affiliative rewards on the willingness to exert work effort and a potential detrimental interaction with different forms of intrinsic motivation. Our experimental results suggest that monetary and affiliative rewards have different effects: affiliative rewards clearly have beneficial effects, whereas the picture for monetary rewards is more nuanced than typically assumed in literature.
引用
收藏
页码:591 / 621
页数:31
相关论文
共 78 条