The core of large differentiable TU games

被引：11

作者：

Epstein, LG

Marinacci, M

机构：

[1] Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA

[2] Univ Turin, Dipartimento Stat & Matemat Applicata, Turin, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2001年 / 100卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

core; transferable utility games; large games; non-atomic games; market games; exchange economies; calculus; derivatives;

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2001.2810

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

For suitable non-atomic TU games v, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of v, yielding one of two stark conclusions: either core(v) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of v. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

引用

页码：235 / 273

页数：39

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