The core of large differentiable TU games

被引:11
|
作者
Epstein, LG
Marinacci, M
机构
[1] Univ Rochester, Dept Econ, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
[2] Univ Turin, Dipartimento Stat & Matemat Applicata, Turin, Italy
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
core; transferable utility games; large games; non-atomic games; market games; exchange economies; calculus; derivatives;
D O I
10.1006/jeth.2001.2810
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
For suitable non-atomic TU games v, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of v, yielding one of two stark conclusions: either core(v) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of v. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:235 / 273
页数:39
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