Screening Talent for Task Assignment: Absolute or Percentile Thresholds?

被引:7
作者
Balakrishnan, Ramji [1 ]
Lin, Haijin [2 ]
Sivaramakrishnan, Konduru [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Iowa, Tippie Coll Business, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
[2] Univ Houston, CT Bauer Coll Business, Houston, TX 77004 USA
[3] Rice Univ, Jones Grad Sch Business, Houston, TX 77251 USA
关键词
incentives; measurement system; relative performance evaluation; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION;
D O I
10.1111/1475-679X.12327
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Matching talents to tasks is an important part of job design. Organizations routinely use performance thresholds to group agents by talent. We see thresholds defined both in terms of an individual's own performance (absolute value) and in terms of peer performance (percentile). Intuition suggests a preference for percentile thresholds because the resulting rank-order statistic is sufficient to assess relative talent. Yet, in the context of a task assignment problem in which the objective is to match talent with task type (using two agents and two task types), we show that absolute thresholds can dominate percentile thresholds under either of two conditions. First, flexibility in task assignment tilts the balance toward absolute thresholds. Second, performance manipulation can adversely affect the inherent advantage of percentile thresholds because they motivate agents to invest relatively more in personally costly influence activities to cast their performance in a favorable light. We examine how these results hold up when there are countably large number of agents and discuss empirical implications.
引用
收藏
页码:831 / 868
页数:38
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