Cooperation under Incomplete Information: Some Strategic Models

被引：0
作者：
Forges, Francoise [1 ]
机构：
[1] PSL Res Univ, Univ Paris Dauphine, CEREMADE & LEDa, Paris, France
来源：
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE | 2017年 / 127卷 / 04期
关键词：
commitment; cooperation; contract; incentives; incomplete information; COMPETING MECHANISMS; FOLK THEOREM; GAMES; EQUILIBRIA;
D O I：
10.3917/redp.274.0467
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Starting from a Bayesian game which accounts for the agents' interaction in absence of any cooperation agreement, we survey some scenarios which enable the players to commit to decisions. We compare the effects of these scenarios and suggest some links with contract theory.
引用
收藏
页码：467 / 493
页数：27
相关论文
共 31 条
[1]  
Aumann R., 1995, Repeated games with incomplete information
[2]  
Aumann R. J., 1968, REPORTS US ARMS CONT, P117
[3]  
CELIK G., 2008, EQUILIBRIUM REJECTIO
[4]   Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design [J].
Celik, Gorkem ;
Peters, Michael .
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE, 2016, 49 (01) :374-411
[5]   Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism [J].
Celik, Gorkem ;
Peters, Michael .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2011, 73 (02) :375-387
[6]   EQUILIBRIA WITH COMMUNICATION IN A JOB MARKET EXAMPLE [J].
FORGES, F .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 105 (02) :375-398
[7]  
Forges F., 2009, Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, P1587
[8]   Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson and mechanism Theory [J].
Forges, Francoise .
REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE, 2007, 117 (06) :873-890
[9]   Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games [J].
Forges, Francoise ;
Horst, Ulrich ;
Salomon, Antoine .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2016, 45 (1-2) :11-36
[10]   COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS [J].
Forges, Francoise ;
Serrano, Roberto .
INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 2013, 15 (02)
1234