The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly

被引：21

作者：

John, Morgan ^{[1
]}

Vardy, Felix

机构：

[1] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA

[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2007年 / 60卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

contests; tournaments; rent-seeking; commitment; costly leader games; noisy leader games;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.009

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the value of commitment in sequential contests when the follower faces small costs to observe the leader's effort. We show that the value of commitment vanishes entirely in this class of games. By contrast, in sequential tournaments-games where, at a cost, the follower can observe the effectiveness of the leader's effort-the value of commitment is preserved completely provided that the observation costs are sufficiently small. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：326 / 338

页数：13

共 26 条

[1] COMMITMENT AND OBSERVABILITY IN GAMES [J].