Posted prices versus bargaining in markets with asymmetric information

被引：34

作者：

Arnold, MA ^{[1
]}

Lippman, SA

机构：

[1] Univ Delaware, Dept Econ, Newark, DE 19716 USA

[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Anderson Sch, Los Angeles, CA USA

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 1998年 / 36卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01727.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A search model is employed to analyze the choice between posting a price and bargaining for the seller of an asset who is imperfectly informed about both buyer valuations and buyer bargaining abilities. A mean preserving increase in risk of buyer valuations is relevant (and beneficial) to the seller; however, only the mean <(gamma)over bar> (and not the distribution) of buyer bargaining abilities is relevant. If <(gamma)over bar> is sufficiently. high, the seller utilizes a posted price. Interestingly! social welfare decreases in <(gamma)over bar>; while an increase in <(gamma)over bar> reduces expected search costs, it also results in misallocation of the good because the seller is less discriminating. (JEL D42, D83).

引用

页码：450 / 457

页数：8

共 19 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1977, VISIBLE HAND, DOI DOI 10.2469/DIG.V42.N2.23

[2] PRICE COMMITMENT IN SEARCH MARKETS [J].