The value of a player in n-person games

被引：25

作者：

Hausken, K

Mohr, M

机构：

[1] Univ Stavanger, Sch Econ Culture & Social Sci, N-4091 Stavanger, Norway

[2] Deutsch Bundesbank, Dept Econ, D-60006 Frankfurt, Germany

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2001年 / 18卷 / 03期

关键词：

European Council; Vote Procedure; Column Player; Respective Player;

D O I：

10.1007/s003550000070

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The article decomposes the Shapley value into a value matrix which gives the value of every player to every other player in n-person games. Element Phi (ij)(nu) in the value matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row player i is beneficial, has no impact, or is not beneficial for column player j. The elements in each row and in each column of the value matrix sum up to the Shapley value of the respective player. The value matrix is illustrated by the voting procedure in the European Council of Ministers 1981-1995.

引用

页码：465 / 483

页数：19