DO RENT-SEEKING GROUPS ANNOUNCE THEIR SHARING RULES?

被引：15

作者：

Baik, Kyung Hwan ^{[1
]}

Lee, Dongryul ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Econ, Seoul 110745, South Korea

[2] Virginia Polytech Inst & State Univ, Dept Econ, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 2012年 / 50卷 / 02期

关键词：

STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; SUCCESS FUNCTIONS; SOCIAL COST; CONTESTS; DISSIPATION; CONFLICT; MONOPOLY; INCENTIVES; SEEKERS;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00280.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study collective rent seeking between two groups in which each group has the option of releasing or not its sharing-rule information. First, we show that the case where both groups release their sharing-rule information never occurs in equilibrium; when the players are unevenly matched, one group releases its sharing-rule information and the other does not. Then, we select the Pareto-superior equilibrium when the players are unevenly matched. We show that, in this selected equilibrium, the underdog releases its sharing-rule information, and the favorite does not; thus, the underdog becomes the leader, and the favorite the follower (JEL D72).

引用

页码：348 / 363

页数：16

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