Capital Structure and Regulation: Do Ownership and Regulatory Independence Matter?

被引：31

作者：

Bortolotti, Bernardo ^{[1
]}

Cambini, Carlo ^{[2
,3
]}

Rondi, Laura ^{[2
,4
]}

Spiegel, Yossi ^{[5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Turin, Dept Econ, I-10134 Turin, Italy

[2] Politecn Torino, I-10129 Turin, Italy

[3] DISPEA, IMT Lucca, I-10129 Turin, Italy

[4] DISPEA, CERIS CNR, I-10129 Turin, Italy

[5] Tel Aviv Univ, Recanati Grad Sch Business Adm, CEPR, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[6] Tel Aviv Univ, ZEW, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2011年 / 20卷 / 02期

关键词：

PANEL-DATA; INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS; OPERATING PERFORMANCE; PRIVATIZED FIRMS; SPECIFICATION; DETERMINANTS; INVESTMENT; EXISTENCE; AGENCIES; LEVERAGE;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00296.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the effect of ownership structure and regulatory independence on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices using a comprehensive panel data of publicly traded European utilities. We find that firms in our sample tend to have a higher leverage if they are privately controlled and regulated by an independent regulatory agency. Moreover, the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on their regulated prices, but not vice versa. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately controlled regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory outcomes.

引用

页码：517 / 564

页数：48

共 61 条

[1]

*AEEG, 2007, 34807 AEEG

[2] Regulation and investment [J].