Quantification of integrity

被引:10
作者
Clarkson, Michael R. [1 ]
Schneider, Fred B. [1 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
QUANTIFYING INFORMATION-FLOW; SECURITY; SEMANTICS; ANONYMITY;
D O I
10.1017/S0960129513000595
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Three integrity measures are introduced: contamination, channel suppression and program suppression. Contamination is a measure of how much untrusted information reaches trusted outputs; it is the dual of leakage, which is a measure of information-flow confidentiality. Channel suppression is a measure of how much information about inputs to a noisy channel is missing from the channel outputs. And program suppression is a measure of how much information about the correct output of a program is lost because of attacker influence and implementation errors. Program and channel suppression do not have interesting confidentiality duals. As a case study, a quantitative relationship between integrity, confidentiality and database privacy is examined.
引用
收藏
页码:207 / 258
页数:52
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