Good Dualism and Private Knowledge

被引:0
作者
Malik, Luke [1 ]
机构
[1] Osaka Univ, Sch Letters, Dept Philosophy & Hist Philosophy, Toyonaka, Osaka 5600043, Japan
来源
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND HUMANITY, PT TWO | 2011年 / 5卷
关键词
physicalism; dualism; mind; knowledge; private;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the consistency of holding two dualist propositions, relating to consciousness, and one physicalist proposition, relating to knowledge. We conclude that accepting all three leads to an absurdity. We contend that a dualist who is true to her dualist principles, the "good dualist", will, thereof, need to reject the physicalist proposition in order to maintain consistency. We show that this opens up a space in which to locate the possibility of private knowledge. We conclude "good dualism" entails a space for private knowledge.
引用
收藏
页码:98 / 100
页数:3
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